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includes a markup for uncompensated care, a surcharge to make up the differthe DRG rate and the lower rate hospitals are reimbursed for treating Medicare»nts f and an extra fee to recoup money lost through discounts to other plans.
DRG add-ons "force the Benefit Plans to incur costs for the benefit of others" if
benefits to pay the full DRG rate, the court said. "ERISA itself forbids benefit plans from paying benefits for anyone other than a plan beneficiary. "
'f!-? Th6New Jersey regulations allow for appeals by individuals whose DRG costs exceed the
actual cost of their hospital care by more than $250, but only if their third-party insurer reimburses the hospital according to DRG rates.
"Again, only if the Benefit Plans choose to ignore the dictates of ERISA and pay DRG
rates can the beneficiaries avail themselves of an appeal, " the court said. "This lack of parity with other hospital payors arises because of a Benefit Plan's administration and it is this
relationship that undergirds the argument in favor of pre-emption. "
The fact that the union health plans do not qualify for an 11 percent open enrollment discount because they must limit their coverage to union members, and therefore end up subsidizing those who do receive the discount, "further supports ERISA pre-emption," the court
added.
The court's ruling lends new urgency to calls for changing the way New Jersey delivers
and finances health care. "We're hoping to force the issue, so the hospitals will decide they
have to come up with some other funding mechanism to pay for uncompensated care in New
Jersey," state AFL-CIO President Charles Marciante told BNA in an April interview about the
case.
The state's much-maligned system of funding uncompensated care through a surcharge
on paying patients' hospital bills has been renewed each time it has expired, despite pleas
from business, labor, hospitals, and health insurers for enactment of a broad-based funding
mechanism. Organized labor has pushed hard for a 1 percent payroll tax, but employer groups
refuse to consider such a measure in the absence of a complete overhaul of the health care
system.
The uncompensated care markup law is due to expire June 30, but lawmakers May 7 approved legislation extending it indefinitely. Florio has until June 22 to act on the bill. An administration source said the governor may conditionally veto the measure, telling lawmakers
he will agree to a temporary extension, but only if certain reforms are enacted. Among the
changes Florio has proposed are requirements that all commercial carriers in New Jersey
sell health insurance to anyone who requests it, at rates established without regard to the applicant's age, sex, health status, occupation, or geographic location.
- 0 -

MERGENCY BOARDS RAIL PROPOSALS
I / GE
GENERALLY FOLLOW 1991 SETTLEMENTS
Reports issued May 28 by three presidential emergency boards appointed to recommend
resolution of contract disputes involving more than 20,000 railroad workers in many respects
follow the contract package applied to railroad workers last year on the recommendation of a
separate presidential panel.
The 1991 rail settlement, which covered more than 100,000 workers on major freight
carriers, initially formed the basis of new contract agreements between three rail unions and
the carriers, and its terms were ultimately imposed on another eight unions after a one-day
strike and the ruling of a second panel. The second panel was created under strike-ending l e g islation adopted by Congress on the day of the walkout in April last year.
The three new reports cover contract disputes involving 7,800 workers on the freight
carriers represented by the International Association of Machinists, 5,200 members of the
Copyright O 1992 by THE BUREAU Of NATIONAL AFFAIRS. INC.. Washington. DC. 20037
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Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees on Conrail, and 7,500 workers on Amtrak reoresented by six different unions.
None of the current agreements were subject to last year's recommendations, altho^eh
negotiations in both instances date back to 1988. The IAM tjroke out of the major freight settlement process last year when the other 11 unions involved agreed to a special procedure for
sending the outstanding issues to the presidential emergency board.
If settlements are not reached, unions in the current disputes will be free to strike at the
end of a 25-day cooling-off period at 12:01 a . m . June 24. Managements would be free to i m pose new contract terms at the same time.
Reports Receive Mixed Reception
Carrier representatives generally welcomed the reliance of the current boards on last
year's settlement, while unions assessed the reports less favorably. In a statement issued bv
Amtrak, however, that carrier said the board's failure to recommend "many of the work rule
changes" it proposed will make that board's recommendation "financially difficult to
implement."
The recommendations in the Amtrak dispute varied more than the others from last
year's rail settlements. Much of the Amtrak report, including the recommended wage p a c k age, was modeled on contract agreements already reached between Amtrak and unions recresenting about 63 percent of its union-represented workers. Those agreements have included
richer wage packages than last year's freight settlement in exchange for work rule r e l i e f .
Amtrak said the recommendations, however, "should provide a basis for further
negotiation."
Jedd Dodd, chief negotiator for the BMWE in the Conrail and Amtrak disputes, said the
recommendations of-the panels "do not provide a basis for settlement." The recommendations, he said, would reduce members' standard of living and impose "intolerable working
conditions."
He said the union would strike if no acceptable agreement can be negotiated with rr.anaeement, and he urged Congress "to stay out of our dispute and permit the free exercise of collective bargaining to end this dispute. "
Edwin Harper, president of the Association of American Railroads, said that although
the reports represent "no great victory," they "offer suggestions for compromise that will
allow the nation's fragile economic recovery to be spared the debilitating effects of a n a t i o n wide rail strike."
In releasing the reports late May 28, White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater said
the president hopes "these reports can form the basis for an equitable resolution of these r a i i labor disputes through negotiation among the parties. "
Wage Recommendations

••"•'.'

The Amtrak emergency board recommended that settlements with Amtrak unions provide
an immediate $2,000 lump-sum payment and a 5 percent wage increase on ratification, f o l lowed by increases of 4 percent on Oct. 1, 1992; 2 percent on Jan. 1, 1993; 3 percent on O c t .
1, 1993; 4 percent on Oct. 1, 1994; and 2 percent on July 1, 1995. In addition, it calls for a
cost-of-living formula to begin paying increases each six months as of July 1, 1995, while negotiations for new contracts are underway.
The board called for the Amtrak agreements, like those in the other disputes, to reopen
for amendment in January 1995.
The boards' wage recommendations in the Conrail and Machinists' disputes, meanwhile,
followed last year's rail pattern, and called for an immediate $2,000 lump-sum increase; a 3
percent lump-sum increase retroactive to July 1, 1991; additional 3 percent lump-sum inCopyright O 1992 by THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS. INC., Washington, D.C. 20037
0418-2003/92/100.50
'
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__es on July 1, 1992, Jan. 1, 1993, and Jan. 1, 1994; a 3 percent general wage increase on
1,1993; a 4 percent general wage increase on July 1, 1994; and a 2 percent lump-sum inon Jan. 1, 1995. The wage package also calls for semiannual cost-of-living adjustments beginning in July 1995 while negotiations continue. The Conrail and Machinists' boards
rejected carrier proposals that the first 3 percent increase should not be retroactive to July
1991, but rather should be paid from the effective dates of agreement.
Although the unions had argued that larger wage increases were justified, the boards
said it would be "inappropriate to treat" the disputes as if they "existed in a vacuum. " Endorsing the unions' wage proposals, the Conrail and Machinists boards said, "would be profoundly destabilizing to the present wage structure of the railroad industry."
The three boards recommended that health and welfare issues be resolved on the same
lines as last year's rail settlement, including provisions for employee cost-sharing beginning
in 1993.
Some Changes In Work Rules Recommended
The Amtrak board endorsed a number of work rule changes proposed by the carrier,
while recommending that others be withdrawn from the bargaining table. It found that a management proposal for a "composite mechanic" position was premature and should be withdrawn, but said proposals seeking reductions in advance notice of change in work-force size
were "needed to allow the carrier to more quickly to stabilize its forces in the event of job
abolishments or displacements."
It recommended that the position of passenger fireman on Amtrak be changed to assistant
passenger engineer with an additional $2.28 per hour payment, but said Amtrak's proposal to
increase from four hours to five hours the running time required before such an employee
must be on board should be dropped.
The Amtrak board endorsed a lower hourly rate for new yard service engineers set at 90
percent of the regular rate for the first two years of service. A proposal from the Brotherhood
of Locomotive Engineers calling for a $250 monthly allowance for engineers who maintain certification, it said, should be withdrawn.
Among other recommendations, the board agreed with the BLE that meal allowances on
Amtrak should be increased from the current $4.15 for employees away from home, and recommended a $5 allowance immediately, with a $1 increase in 1994. The union is seeking a 510
rr.eal allowance.
Both the Amtrak and Conrail boards recommended approval of carrier proposals to
eliminate geographic restrictions on the use of traveling work gangs represented by the
BMWE. The use of high-technology equipment by these workers justifies removing the r e s t r i c tions , the boards said. The BMWE argued that the removal of geographic boundaries would
clace an undue burden on employees who would have to travel over extended distances.
The Conrail board also recommended that the Monday-Friday work week be replaced
with a schedule that guarantees employees either Saturday or Sunday off. It also agreed that
management should be allowed to schedule starting times over a broader period than the c u r rent 6 a. m to 8 a. m. starting period.
It rejected the carrier's argument that BMWE gangs should not be paid for travel time
from camp units to work sites, but said 15 minutes of travel time each way could be unpaid.
The three emergency board were chaired by Benjamin Aaron. Also serving on all three
boards were David Twomey and Eric Schmertz. Arnold Zack and Preston Jay Moore both
served on the Conrail and Amtrak boards. All the panel members are labor-management
arbitrators.
Copies of the three emergency bo_ard reports are available for a fee from_BNA, Plus: the tolifree nationwide telephone number is 1-800-452-7773; or (202) 452-4323 in the Washington area. /
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\E PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK AND

NEW JERSEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING
In the Matter of the Discipline

of

OPINION AND AWARD

RUSSELL BALLANTYNE

The PORT AUTHORITY seeks the discharge of RUSSELL BALLANTYNE for
testing positive for use of marijuana.
BALLANTYNE, hereinafter referred to as the

"grievant" is a

Structural Maintenance Mechanic which he and the Authority agree is a
safety sensitive job.

He entered the Authority's Employee Assistance

Program after he was found by Authority police in possession of marijuana
cigarettes.
regularly

Over almost two years in the Assistance

and at times randomly tested for drug use.

Program he was
Except for the

beginning of almost two years of surveillance, and except for the test
that is the subject of this case, his drug tests were negative.

With

about two months remaining in the two year program, on April 21, 1992, he
was tested.

The report of that test, made known on April 24, 1992, was

positive for marijuana.
At the time he requested but was denied a new urine test.
the Authority agreed to retest the same urine sample.
retest of the same urine specimen was also positive.

But

The result of the
Those tests are the

subjects of this proceeding.
The grievant denies the use of marijuana found in his urine from
the April 21st test and the retest of that specimen.

He asserts that he

was exposed to "passive inhalation" of marijuana for several hours at a
party he attended in a small, closed basement area, where there were about
fifty guests, three quarters of whom smoked marijuana continuously.

In

support of this defense, he submitted into evidence, without Authority
objection, except the observation that they were hearsay, sworn statements
from two guests at the party affirming the extensive use of marijuana at
the party, the heavy concentration of marijuana smoke, and the close and
crowded conditions.
Apparently, if the grievant had admitted the allegations, he
would have been referred back to the Employee Assistance Program and given
another chance to complete it successfully while retaining his employment
with the Authority.
But because he denies the charges he was advised by his attorney
not to continue in the program as that would be construed as an admission
of

the

charge.

Instead,

though

he continued

to meet with medical

representatives of the Authority and was and is willing to continue to be
tested, he has not participated further in the formal counseling aspects
of the Program.
I agree with the medical testimony of the Authority that bare,
external exposure to or passive inhalation of marijuana smoke would not
produce the positive results found in the grievant's system as a result of
the April 21st test, unless the^e2<pjpsjare_wjisJ,jL.Jatense; heavily concentrated
over an extended period of time, and from a small, closed and unventilated
location.

The problem with that position by the Authority is two fold.
First, the grievant's testimony and the "hearsay" affidavits of three
guests at the party assert the factual existence of just those conditions.
And,

more

significantly,

possibility

of the

the Authority's physician

acknowledged

the

low positive level of the grievant's test if the

exposure and passive inhalation were of the nature and magnitude claimed
by the grievant
reservation

to

and supported
that

by the affidavits.

acknowledgement

was

that

Dr. Segal's only

under

circumstances, the grievant would have became "high."

those

intense

And, because in

this case there is no evidence of that effect on the grievant, his story
of exposure and passive inhalation cannot be believed.
Both

sides

have

submitted

scholarly

and medical

citations

relating to the effects of passive exposure and passive inhalation of
marijuana.
either

I deem these citations to be offsetting and hence inconclusive

way.

The material

introduced

by the Authority

skepticism and rejection of the grievant's explanation.
articles introduced by the grievant

support

support its

Contrariwise the

the plausibility

of his

defense.
Instead, what I deem probative is the grievant's unrefuted
testimony about the overwhelming presence of marijuana smoke at the party
he attended, and Dr. Segal's acknowledgement that, except for the absence
of the grievant experiencing a "high," the low but positive level of
marijuana found in his urine could have been produced from the conditions
claimed to be present at the party, namely a marijuana smoke filled and
closed small area, with continuous exposure over several hours.

With that acknowledgement and with the offsetting nature of the
authoritative medical writings submitted

I am not satisfied that the

Authority has met its "just cause" burden for the grievant's discharge.
And I am not satisfied that that burden, which an employer must meet to
sustain or effectuate a discharge, has been met even in the absence of
evidence that the grievant also experienced a "high."

To sustain the

request for discharge on the single reservation that the grievant did not
experience a "high" would, to meet the burden of proving "just cause,"
require more evidence showing that that condition was an unvaried and
absolute

condition

of passive exposure

positive test results.

and

inhalation that produced

Or, in other words, evidence, that unless a "high"

is experienced by everyone so exposed, there was not enough exposure to
produce a positive test result.
Such evidence, raising that single condition to that absolute
level, has not been shown with the requisite conclusiveness in this case
to meet the Authority's burden of proving just cause by evidence that is
clear and convincing.
The Authority has some understandable suspicions, and frankly so
do I.

It suggests the grievant missed or cancelled counseling session

because he was smoking marijuana and did not want to be tested at those
times.

It suggests that he entered the Employment Assistance Program

originally, and repaired to it and sought one of its counselors after the
positive result of the April 21st test, only as a cover for his marijuana
use and as a protection against disciplinary action.

That may be so, but,

so far as this record is concerned, it is speculative and a suspicion.
Speculations and suspicions are not the quality of hard evidence required
by the just cause standard of proof.

Accordingly,
grievant's discharge.

I shall deny the Authority's request
He is entitled to continue

employ and he shall be reinstated.
entitled to back pay.

for the

in the Authority's

However, I do not find that he is

In his testimony he stated that not only did he not

smoke or use marijuana during the relevant surveillance period of the
Assistance Program, but knew he should avoid locations and circumstances
where marijuana was used by others.

He even testified that he was

concerned about going to rock concerts because marijuana was smoked there.
And though he testified that the Assistance Program counselors told him
that he could attend those concerts, he relies on this sensitiveness to
marijuana exposure to support his assertion that he did not use it just
prior to the April 21st test.
That being his position, I can find no justification for his
attendance at, or especially his continued presence at a party at which
marijuana was extensive smoked and where marijuana smoke permeated the
area for several hours.

That he remained at that party under these

conditions is manifestly inconsistent with his acknowledged understanding
that he should not (and would

not) expose himself to these conditions.

Indeed, I accept the Authority's assertion that part of the Assistance
Program included the admonition to avoid these circumstance.

That he did

not quickly leave the party when the intense presence of marijuana had
become apparent was inconsistent with what he knew or should have known
was expressly or impliedly proscribed by the Assistance Program.

Clearly,

that his counselors let him attend an open-air rock concert, was not a
license to remain in a small, close, marijuana smoked filled room (in a
basement) for several hours.

I am satisfied that the grievant knew or

should have known the distinction, but did not conduct himself either
accordingly or appropriately.

I consider that an offense that does not justify his discharge,
but which does justify a disciplinary suspension for the period of time
that he has been suspended from work and for which he has not been paid.
The Undersigned

duly designated as the Hearing Officer, and

having duly heard the proofs and allegations

of the grievant and the

Authority, makes the following AWARD:

The Authority's request that RUSSELL BALLANTYNE be
discharged is denied.

Just cause has not been proved

for that penalty. However, though BALLANTYNE shall be
restored

to active employment, it shall be without

back pay.

The period of time between his present

suspension and his reinstatement to active employment
shall be deemed a disciplinary suspension, for which
I have found there is just cause.

Eric J/ Schmertz,Hearing Orficer

DATED:

September 25, 1992

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

ss:
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument,
which is my AWARD.

October 23, 1992

Laurie J. Fornabai, Esq.
Port Authority of NY & NJ
Law Department
One World Trade Center
New York, New York 10048
Timothy M. Donohue, Esq.
Arseneault, Donohue, Sorrentino
& Fassett
560 Main Street
Chatham, New Jersey 07928
Re:

Ballantyne/Port Authority Arbitration

Dear Ms. Fornabai and Mr. Donohue:
This is in reply to frespective letters of
October 8 and October 15, 1992. ^
Whether Mr. Ballantyne is obligated to continue
in the EAP depends on what his status was at the time
that he was suspended.
If at that time, he still had a period of time
to go to complete his EAP commitment, he remains
obligated to do so now. However, if at the time of his
suspension he had completed his EAP commitment, he is not
obligated to continue in the program under my Award.
sjjThis
clarification does not
limit the
tjgss' right to require further EAP commitments
from.Mr. Ballantyne if there are further violations of
the p^3thoriti«s drug policy.

f

Very truly yours,

Eric J. Schmertz
EJS/ps

THE PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY

In the Matter of the Discipline
DECISION

of

William P. Kernochan

In accordance with Exhibits L and M (Major Disciplinary
Proceedings - Impartial Hearing Officer) of the collective bargaining agreement between the Port Authority and the Maintenance
Division of the Building and Construction Trades Council of
Greater New York, and Port Authority Instruction 20-1.10, the
Undersigned was selected as the Impartial Hearing Officer to
hear and decide disciplinary charges against William P. Kernochan
A hearing was held on May 6, 1992 at which time representatives of the Port Authority appeared, as did a representative
of the above-named Union.

Mr. Kernochan did not appear, though

he received due notice of the hearing and had told his Union
representative that he intended to appear.

On the Port Authority

motion, the hearing preceded in his absence.
The Port Authority seeks Mr. Kernochan's dismissal.

The

record amply establishes the Authority's right to do so.
Mr. Kernochan's job as a Trades Helper requires that he
possess a valid drivers license.

It is undisputed that Mr.

Kernochan's license has been suspended for what appears to be
an extended period of time prospectively, if not indefinitely.

-2-

He has at least 24 points on his suspended license.

On that

ground alone he is presently unqualified to perform his job
and there is not reasonable prospect that he will be able to
perform it any time in the future.

The suspension of his

license, due to operating violations on his part, make him
the architect of his own disqualification.
Additionally, he has an extensive prior disciplinary
record for this and other offenses, for which he was disciplined
on a progressive disciplinary basis.
For the foregoing reasons, the Port Authority has just cause
to discharge Mr. Kernochan from its employ.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Impartial Hearing
Officer makes the following decision:
The Port Authority has grounds to
discharge William P. Kernochan.
Its
request for a ruling permitting it to
do so is granted.

DATED: May 9, 1992
STATE OF: New York
COUNTY OF: New York

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Hearing Officer

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

THE PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK AND
NEW JERSEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING
In the Matter of the Discipline
OPINION AND AWARD
of

DOCKET NO. 789
RACQUEL GALEANO

The Port Authority seeks the discharge of Racquel Galeano for
excessive absenteeism and for Absence Without Leave.
A

hearing

was

held

on

July

30,

1992

at

which

time

representatives of the Port Authority and Local 1400 Transport Workers
Union of America appeared.

Ms. Galeano failed to appear.

I am satisfied that Ms. Galeano received due and legal notice of
the hearing.

The Port Authority introduced evidence of notices of the

Intent to Discharge and the Charges and Specifications, together with
notices of the hearing date, time and location, sent to Ms. Galeano by
registered mail to her address as recorded

in the Port

Authority's

records, and evidence of return receipt cards signed by members of Ms.
Galeano's family.

Moreover, the Port Authority

introduced evidence

showing that Ms. Galeano personally requested an adjournment

of the

hearing originally scheduled for an earlier date; evidence that the Port
Authority granted her request and rescheduled the hearing for July 30,
1992 and sent her due notice thereof.
The Port Authority introduced evidence of Ms. Galeano's absentee
records during 1990, 1991 and 1992 and a report of Formal Counselling
given to her in June 1991 in which she was warned of the consequences of
a failure to improve her attendance record.

Additionally, the Port Authority cites Section VI of the MOA
expressly incorporated in the collective bargaining agreement with Local
1400 TWUA, (Ms. Galeano's bargaining agent), providing for a waiver of the
right to a disciplinary hearing in the event of failure to appear at said
hearing after due notice.

On this latter ground alone, the Port Authority

argues that Ms. Galeano should be forthwith

terminated.

In the absence of Ms. Galeano, her Union representatives who
were present to represent and defend her, were unable to and therefore did
not contest the foregoing evidence introduced by the Port Authority.
Accordingly, on all the grounds advanced by the Port Authority,
and especially the fact that Ms. Galeano has been AWOL from February 21 to
the present date, I deem that Ms. Galeano has abandoned her job with the
Port

Authority,

and

the

Port

Authority

has

just

cause

to formally

discharge her from its employ.

A W A R D

The Port Authority's request that Racquel Galeano be
discharged, is granted.

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Hearing Officer
DATED:

August 4, 1992

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

ss:
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument,
which is my AWARD.

THE PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK AND
NEW JERSEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING
In the Matter of the Discipline
OPINION AND AWARD
of
DOCKET NO. 789
RACQUEL GALEANO

The Port Authority seeks the discharge of Racquel Galeano for
excessive absenteeism and for Absence Without Leave.
A

hearing

representatives

was

held

on

July

30,

1992

at

which

time

of the Port Authority and Local 1400 Transport Workers

Union of America appeared.

Ms. Galeano failed to appear.

I am satisfied that Ms. Galeano received due and legal notice of
the hearing.

The Port Authority introduced evidence of notices of the

Intent to Discharge and the Charges and Specifications, together with
notices of the hearing date, time and location, sent to Ms. Galeano by
registered

mail to her

address as recorded

in the Port

Authority's

records, and evidence of return receipt cards signed by members of Ms.
Galeano's
showing

family.

Moreover, the Port Authority

that Ms. Galeano personally

requested

introduced

evidence

an adjournment of the

hearing originally scheduled for an earlier date; evidence that the Port
Authority granted her request and rescheduled the hearing for July 30,
1992 and sent her due notice thereof.
The Port Authority introduced evidence of Ms. Galeano's absentee
records during 1990, 1991 and 1992 and a report of Formal Counselling
given to her in June 1991 in which she was warned of the consequences of
a failure to improve her attendance record.

Additionally, the Port Authority cites Section VI of the MOA
expressly incorporated in the collective bargaining agreement with Local
1400 TWUA, (Ms. Galeano's bargaining agent), providing for a waiver of the
right to a disciplinary hearing in the event of failure to appear at said
hearing after due notice.

On this latter ground alone, the Port Authority

argues that Ms. Galeano should be forthwith terminated.
In the absence of Ms. Galeano, her Union representatives who
were present to represent and defend her, were unable to and therefore did
not contest the foregoing evidence introduced by the Port Authority.
Accordingly, on all the grounds advanced by the Port Authority,
and especially the fact that Ms. Galeano has been AWOL from February 21 to
the present date, I deem that Ms. Galeano has abandoned her job with the
Port

Authority,

and

the

Port

Authority

has

just

cause

to formally

discharge her from its employ.

A W A R D

The Port Authority's request that Racquel Galeano be
discharged, is granted.

^g^^>^^

Eric J . / S c h m e r t z 7
Impar|zial Hearing Officer
DATED:

August 4, 1992

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

ss:

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument,
which is my AWARD.

PORT AUTHORITY of NEW YORK and NEW JERSEY

In the Matter of the
Disciplinary Hearings
°
Richard Flippen

OPINION and AWARD

The Port Authority seeks the discharge of Richard Flippen
for substantial violation of the General Rules and Regulations
for all Port Authority Employees as set forth in the Charges
and Specifications dated June 5 and June 9, 1992 and introduced
into evidence as Authority Exhibit #1.
A hearing was held on October 9, 1992 at which time Mr.
Flippen, hereinafter referred to as "Flippen" and representatives
of the Port Authority, hereinafter referred to as the "Authority"
and the Building and Construction Trades Council, hereinafter
referred to as the "Union," appeared.

All concerned were afforded

full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and
cross-examine witnesses.
Flippen admits the charges and specifications with an explanation.

He explains that he committed the acts charged be-

cause of a drug habit which had become increasingly expensive.
The Hearing Officer's role and jurisdiction is to decide
whether the offenses were committed by the employee charged and
if so, whether that offense(s) constitutes cause for discharge.
In the instant case, the answer to both parts of that question
is in the affirmative.

-2-

The Charges and Specifications against Flippen and which he admits are essentially charges of theft.

If there is anything well

settled it is that theft of the admitted magnitude in this case
is cause for discharge irrespective of the employee's prior
record.

And, if as here the employer decides to request that

penalty the Hearing Officer has no right to substitute a different
judgment for the exercise of that right.
Mitigation of the penalty may be awarded by the Hearing
Officer only if the charges are not fully proved or admitted
and if the penalty of discharge is not appropriate for the
offences.

That is not the situation here.

Under the circum-

stances where as here the charges have been admitted and where
they constitute recognized grounds for discharge, mitigation of
that penalty is for the Authority to consider, not for the Hearing
Officer to order.
Flippen and his Union on his behalf made eloquent pleas for
compassion and for another chance for him.

It appears that he

may have overcome his drug abuse habit and has rehabilitated
himself enough to be free of the circumstances which he claims
caused his misconduct.

He is an employee of almost 30 years

services with a virtually unblemished record.

I am most

sym-

pathetic to his personal struggle to straighten out his life,
and it is fervently hoped that he will succeed.
matter how understanding

However, no

of his problem I may be, the fact re-

mains that he committed a summary dismissal offense for which
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the Authority has the right, which its chooses to invoke, to
discharge him.

I find that I have no choice but to sustain

the Authority's right to do so.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Hearing Officer
in the above matter, and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the parties, makes the following AWARD:
The Port Authority's request that
Richard Flippen be discharge is
granted.

Eric J. Schmertz
Hearing Officer
DATED: October 12, 1992
STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.
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In the Matter of
the Disciplinary Charges Against
MARVIN LABERTH

In the Matter of the Arbitration

OPINION

between

DECISION

The Port Authority of New York and
New Jersey

AWARD

and
Transport Workers Union Local 1400
-X

In

the

disciplinary

proceeding,

the

Authority

seeks

the

dismissal of MARVIN LABERTH ("LABERTH") for his alleged violations of a
Waiver Agreement dated July 18, 1991 relating to his participation in the
Authority's Employee Assistance Program.

The arbitration case involves a

grievance by the Union protesting the Authority's refusal or failure to
restore LABERTH to duty and a contention that his employment status
resulting from the discipline charges constitutes an improper "suspension"
under the Collective Bargaining Agreement.
There are unique legalities and facts about this case that are
critically different from others arising from the Authority's Employee
Assistance

Program and which are determinative in deciding both the

discipline and arbitration issues.
The relevant Waiver which LABERTH signed and which the Union
obtained on his behalf from the Authority was, in one significant respect,
different from the traditional Waiver. Certain language customarily used

previously was changed.

The usual language applicable in prior cases, and

for example in a similar discipline case involving ANTHONY JAMES ("JAMES")
read in Paragraph E:
Prior to (employee's name) return to duty as a (job
classification)...he shall undergo a urine test and
will be returned to duty upon negative results and if
determined to be fit for duty by the Office of Medical
Services.
Under that language, as in JAMES1 case, an employee was not
necessarily restored to work if he tested negative for drug use but needed
the additional certification of the Authority's Medical Department that he
was "fit for duty."

In other words, an employee could be properly and

effectively barred from return to duty by a Medical Department finding
that he was "unfit for duty" even if his drug test was negative.
The first draft of the relevant Waiver in the LABERTH matter
followed that traditional form.

Paragraph E of the unsigned draft read:

Prior to LABERTH's return to duty as a Building and
Grounds Attendant at Newark Airport, he shall undergo
a urine

test

and will be returned

to duty upon

negative results and if determined to be fit for duty
by the Office of Medical Services.
However, explicitly at the request of the Union, the language
was changed for LABERTH in the final Waiver which he, the Union and the
Authority ultimately executed.

The pivotal language of Paragraph E of his

Waiver read:
Prior to LABERTH's return to duty as a Building and
Grounds Attendant at Newark Airport, he shall undergo

a urine test and will be reinstated to duty upon
negative results.
Specifically, and as a result of direct negotiations between
representatives of the Union and the Authority, the last part of the
traditional Paragraph E, namely the provision "and if determined to be fit
for duty by the Office of Medical Services," was deleted.

The record

shows that it was deleted expressly in the LABERTH case because the Union
told the Authority that it did not want LABERTH confronted with what
happened to JAMES.

Apparently, JAMES tested negative for drugs but was

denied restoration to duty because the Medical Department found him unfit,
nonetheless.
This Arbitrator did not change Paragraph E of the Waiver in the
instant case, nor did ne participated in any of the negotiations leading
to that change.
and

specifically

The parties did it themselves, directly, unambiguously
for

the

LABERTH

situation.

The

participating

representatives of the parties are knowledgeable and sophisticated.
conclusion is inescapable.

The

They intended to permit LABERTH to return to

work upon and following a negative drug test.

It could have been but was

not conditioned on his cooperation or compliance with other aspects of the
program at the time he tested negative.

It was not conditioned on a

series of negative tests or negative results for any specific period of
time. Rather, it was written in the singular.

Unambiguously, it provides

for restoration to duty on the occurrence of a single event, a negative
test, the balance of his record and/or compliance with the Employee
Assistance Program up to that point notwithstanding.
Put another way, at the point that his drug test was negative,
and in the absence of any disciplinary action for other alleged violations
of the Waiver up to that point (such as absenteeism

from the program

sessions or other examples of lack of cooperation) the single event of a
negative

test

required

his

restoration

to

duty.

Therefore,

the

Authority's reliance on other alleged violations before the negative test
and for which no disciplinary charges were filed or pursued, would be
misplaced.
It is undisputed that LABERTH underwent a urine test on July 18,
1991 and that the test was reported negative on or about July 22, 1991.
I conclude that he should have been restored to duty at that point.
Subsequent events and allegations of failure to comply with Employee
Assistance Program requirements are per force irrelevant to whether or not
he should have been returned to work on the earlier date.
In that connection, had he been restored to duty in accordance
with that specially worded Waiver, the subsequent events which triggered
the disciplinary case, specifically the Medical Department's directive
that he attend an in-patient drug rehabilitation program prior to being
found fit for duty and before he could return to work, would not have
taken place.

Logically, therefore, the disciplinary action arising from

that latter

event is mooted, making it unnecessary to deal with the

Union's grievance charging an unjust "suspension."
Remaining is the matter of remedy.

Frankly, I agree with the

Authority that LABERTH has not shown that he is free of a cocaine habit.
Considering his entire medical history, I am not persuaded that had he
been restored to duty he would have worked from that point to now drug
free.

Indeed, considering his medical record and his several compliance

failures during an earlier Waiver period, (i.e. absenteeism from and
cancellation

of program

and treatment

otherwise, at least in my mind.
Authority,

if not unjust,

sessions) the

presumption

is

Therefore, I consider it unfair to the

and probably an unjustified

enrichment to

LABERTH to order his reinstatement with back pay.

I choose not to totally

ignore his overall record or the events following July 22, 1992.

The

appropriate remedy in my judgement, on both legal and equitable grounds
under the particular circumstances of this case, is that he be reinstated
but without back pay.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Hearing Officer of the
disciplinary charges and the Arbitrator under the arbitration provisions
of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, and having duly heard the proofs
and allegations of the above-named parties makes the following Decision
and AWARD:
MARVIN LABERTH shall be restored to duty as a Building
and Grounds Attendant at Newark Airport but without
back pay.

Eric J. Schmertz, Arbitrator
DATED:

January 29, 1992

STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NEW YORK
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument,
which is my AWARD.

TWA - ALPA SYSTEM BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Air Line Pilots Association

A W A R D
Case No. TWA 056-90

and
Trans World Airlines

The Undersigned, duly designated as the System Board of
Adjustment in the above matter, and having duly heard the proofs
and allegations of the above-named parties, make the following
AWARD:
The Company did not violate Section 6(B)
and related sections of the Agreement
when it terminated the Student Captain
Training Program of William H. Fountain
and assigned him to permanent Flight
Engineer status.

STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York
September
1992

Eric J. Schmertz
Neutral Referee

T, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument , which is my AWARD.

STATE OF
COUNTY OF
September

M. M. Fliniau
Concurring

1992

I, M. M. Fliniau do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my AWARD.
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STATE OF
COUNTY OF
September

B. K. Miller
Concurring
1992

I, B. K. Miller do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my AWARD.

STATE OF
COUNTY OF
September

D. H. Brown, Jr.
Dissenting
1992

I, D. H. Miller, Jr. do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is ray AWARD.

STATE OF
COUNTY OF
September

J. R. Dell Isola
Dissenting
1992

I, J. R. Dell Isola do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my AWARD.

TWA -ALPA SYSTEM BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Air Line Pilots Association

O P I N I O N
of NEUTRAL REFEREE
Case No. TWA 056-90

and
Trans World Airlines

The stipulated issue is:
Whether or not the Company violated Section
6(B) and related sections of the Agreement
when it failed to afford William H. Fountain
a fair and adequate opportunity to complete
his Student Captain Training Program and assigned him to permanent Flight Engineer status?
Hearings were held in St. Louis, Missouri on March 26
and 27, 1992, at which time Mr. Fountain hereinafter referred
to as the "grievant" and representatives of the above-named
Company and Union appeared.

All concerned were afforded full

opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and
cross-examine witnesses.
Captains D. H. Brown, Jr. and J. R. Dell Isola served as
the Union members of the Board of Arbitration.

Captains M. M.

Fliniau and B. K. Miller, served as the Company members of the
Board.

The Undersigned was selected and served as the Neutral

Referee.
The Oath of the Arbitrators was waived; a stenographic
record of the hearing was taken; the Union and the Company filed
post-hearing briefs; and the Board of Arbitration met in executive
session on August 26, 1992.

-2Section 6(B) of the Agreement reads in pertinent part:
When a pilot fails initial upgrading to
qualify as Captain or First Officer, the
pilot will be assigned to the Flight Engineer status at his/her permanent domicile
and shall not thereafter be eligible to exercise a bid to a higher status nor shall
the pilot be eligible for the prerogatives
of Section 6(D)(6) and (7) below. Further
such pilot shall not be eligible to serve
in the international relief officer position. Pilots assigned hereunder may exercise their rights under Section 21.
Also relevant and relied on by the Union are certain
Sections of the Company's Line Standards Guide, specifically
subparagraphs a. and b, which read:
a. The following requirements will govern the
line qualification of captains on TWA aircraft in addition to the requirements outlined in the Airman qualifications section
of the Flight Operations Policy Manual:
(1) Satisfactory completion of seventy (70)
hours programmed line operating experience
with a line check airman. If performance
during line flying is above standard, the
line check airman, with the concurrence of
the General Manager - Flying, may recommend
a semifinal line check after 35 hours.
b. Normally this program should be sufficient to
establish the potential of the student captain
for promotion to captain status. However, at
the discretion of the General Manager - Flying,
an additionally reasonable amount of line operating experience, normally not to exceed thirty
(30) hours, may be prescribed. Upon satisfactory
completion of this additional line time, a satisfactory semi-final and/or final line check must
be completed.
The Company removed the grievant from the DC~9 Captain
Training Program after forty-eight hours and forty minutes for
what the Company characterizes as a "dangerous lack of situational
awareness."

Pursuant to Section 6(B), he was disqualified from
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any further attempt to qualify as a Captain, and assigned permanently to Flight Engineer status.
As the stipulated issue indicates, the Union asserts that
the Company erred by failing to accord the grievant at least 70
hours in the program.

It claims that but for a final unsatis-

factory rating by Captain Schaefer

(the grievant's last

instruc-

tor), relating to a landing attempt in St. Louis on October 24,
1991, the grievant was progressing

adequately.

It asserts that

his ratings by his instructors were at least minimally satisfactory to continue him in the program; it disputes the alleged
errors of October 24th and that, like other student pilots
"similarly

situated" the grievant would have qualified had he

been allowed to remain in the Program the "prescribed" 70 hours.
Or, alternatively, he would have qualified if accorded the additional 30 hours contemplated by Section b. of the Guide.
Additionally, the Union points to certain steps within the
Program, as set forth in the Guide, with which it claims the Company failed to comply, such as not sending the grievant "back to
the simulator" after he made errors on Flight 669, and not giving
him the "opportunity to have an evaluation ride," as examples of
unfairness and procedural defects which should nullify the termination of the Program and the grievant's disqualification.
In support of its contention that the grievant was showing
adequate competence and progress, the Union cites the fact that he
"has FAA type ratings on the B-757, B-747 and DC~9" and has worked

-4as "First Officer on the B~707, B-727 and B-767" with more than
6000 hours in that capacity.
The Union discounts any benefit the grievant may have
obtained from an earlier DO9 Student Pilot Training Program,
which he undertook unsuccessfully, some fourteen months earlier.
It claims that the fourteen intervening months were in fact
prejudicial to the grievant's abilities as a pilot, because, assigned during that period as a Flight Engineer, his piloting
skills eroded.

And, as that earlier disqualification was set

aside, the intervening months as a Flight Engineer, with attendant loss of piloting experience and skills, should have been a
reason to give him more time to qualify.
The Company argues that the 70 hour training period is
not a minimum guarantee.

It claims, as in this case, that if a

student fails to demonstrate requisite progress, ability or skill,
it may terminate the Program earlier.

It denies any disparate

treatment of the grievant, asserting that he was demonstrably
worse than others cited, and in the the Company's judgment had
committed so many mistakes during the FAN, First and Second Line
phases of the program, that its judgment that he would not qualify
even if accorded more time in the Program was fair and reasonable.

1.

His disqualification from that Program was overturned by an
earlier System Board of Adjustment on procedural grounds.
Pursuant to the Award of that Board, and undisputed in this
case, the Company accorded the grievant the instant Training
Program as a class of one, and "from the beginning."

-5--

Th e mistakes the grievant made, as testified to by his instructors, and on which the Company bases its case in this proceeding,
are set forth both in the stenographic record and on pages 13,
14 and 15 of the Company's brief, and need not be recited here.
From the record and testimony, I am not persuaded that the Company's decision to remove the grievant from the Program was based
solely on the October 24th "missed landing approach at St. Louis."
That may well have triggered the decision, but all of the reported
errors and mistakes, which the Company cumulatively deem to show
"a dangerous lack of situational awareness," were considered by
the Company and were integral factors in its decision.
Aside from the St. Louis landing on October 24th, and the
allegation of "flying into a thunderstorm," the facts

surrounding

the other cited mistakes are not seriously disputed.
However, an arbitral evaluation of all of the circumstances
of the alleged mistakes, is controlled by a well settled rule
that is followed by a majority of arbitrators including this
arbitrator.

That rule is that in cases where an employee's

ability and skill to perform a particular job is in question,
the employer's assessment will be accorded a presumption of
accuracy and validity, unless that assessment is shown to be
arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory or even unreasonable.

This

rule, in my view, is especially applicable where, as here, the
matter of

safety is paramount.

Within the foregoing rule, the Company's decision cannot
be found to have been improper.

The Company intended to give
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the grievant a full, second change to qualify.
FAM, First and Second Line were accorded him.
were acceptable to him.

The three phases,
His instructors

One was the same who worked with him

during his first effort, and was of his choosing the second time.
There is no claim or evidence of any illwill between the
grievant and his instructors.

On the contrary, the record shows

that the instructors tried diligently to get him qualified and
one even offered to work with him during off hours.

Therefore

I must find that the testimony of those instructors, including
Captain Schaeffer's report of the St. Louis landing on October
24th, the testimony regarding

flying into a storm, and all the

other specific incidents, was truthful, accurate and objective.
With that conclusion it follows that the Company's determination
that the grievant "dangerously lacked situational awareness" was
factually rooted and reasonable.
Therefore, unless the Company was contractually

barred

from shortening the grievant's Training Program by less than
70 hours, or if the grievant was treated in a disparate manner,
the termination of the Program after 48 hours was proper.

Nor

is the earlier termination nullified by an ommission of one more
simulator experience or an evaluation ride.

Considering the

grievant's numerous mistakes and, cumulatively, his unsatisfactory
rating, it has not been shown that those two experiences would
have made any difference, even assuming arguendo, they were a
mandatory part of the Program.
The evidence does not support a conclusion of disparate
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treatment.
questionable

Though the Union cites other pilots who were of
qualifications along the way in the Program, and

who ultimately qualified after 70 or 100 hours, there has been
no specific showing that they had as many difficulties as the
grievant or had shown as little progress as he at relatively the
same point.

In short, the Company's case that the grievant was

demonstrably worse than others, has not been rebutted, and that
conclusion also has not been shown to be arbitrary, capricious
or unreasonable.
I reject the Union's claim that he should have been given
extra time or consideration because of the 14 intervening months
as a Flight Engineer.

At most, that neutralized, not diluted his

earlier experience in the Program.

I do not think it set him

back, especially since the instant Training Program was "from
the beginning."
That the grievant possesses certain FAA credentials and
has had First Officer experience on other types of aircraft does
not establish his qualifications as a DC~9 pilot.

It is the

Company's standards and qualifications to pilot a DC~9 that obtain
and are relevant in this case, not what may be required or accepted by the FAA.

And it is the ability to fly a DC~9, not another

type of aircraft that is the critical question in this case.
The final question, namely whether the Company has the
contractual right to terminate the Training Program before 70
hours, has been answered and settled by a prior System Board
Award.

In ALPA Case No. NY-84~79/Drake, the System Board, headed
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by Neutral Referee Preston Moore, stated that the Program "provided no automatic right to 100 specific hours of training" and
that "The Company had the right during any step of the training
to terminate the training."

To my mind, implicit of course, is

that the Company's right to terminate the instant Program before
70 hours must be based on cause and justified.

With that implicit

condition, I am in full agreement with the holding in Drake.
Here, for the reasons aforementioned, the Company had cause
and justification for terminating the grievant's Training Program
short of 70 hours.
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The

Undersigned,

duly

designated

as

the

System

Board

of

Adjustment, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the abovenamed parties, make the following AWARD:
1.

The Company has not proved by the clear and
convincing standard of evidence required,
that it had just and sufficient cause for
disciplining Captain Louis A. Klemp, Jr.
with a 30-day suspension.

2.

That 30-day suspension is set aside.

3.

For his lack of truthfulness at the hearing
regarding

a

statement

he

made

at

the

investigation, the grievant shall not be
made whole for the time lost.

Instead, the

30-day suspension is reduced to a 10-day
suspension. He shall be made whole for the
difference.

Eric J. Schmertz, Neutral Referee
DATED:

July 28, 1992

STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)
ss:
)

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument,
which is my AWARD.

John R. Dell Isola
Concurring in #1 and #2
Dissenting from #3
DATED:

July 28, 1992

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

ss:
)

I, John R. Dell Isola do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my AWARD.

Donald H. Brown, Jr.
Concurring in #1 and #2
Dissenting from #3
DATED:

July 28, 1992

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

ss:

I, Donald H. Brown, Jr. do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my AWARD.

William F. McKinney
Dissenting from #1 and #2
Concurring in #3
DATED:

July 28, 1992

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

ss:
)

I, William F. McKinney do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my AWARD.

Darrell T. Webb
Dissenting from #1 and #2
Concurring in #3
DATED:

July 28, 1992

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

ss:

I, Darrell T. Webb do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument,
which is my AWARD.

AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION-TRANS WORLD
AIRLINES SYSTEM BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
OPINION OF
NEUTRAL REFEREE

AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION
and

TRANS WORLD AIRLINES
-X

The stipulated issue is:
Whether or not the Company had just and sufficient
cause for disciplining Captain Louis A. Klemp, Jr. for
the reasons assigned in Captain R.A. Pitts' letter of
September 11, 1990, and if not, what shall be the
remedy?
A hearing was held on February 5, 1992 at which time Captain
Klemp, hereinafter referred to as the grievant and representatives of the
above-named Company and Union appeared.

All concerned were afforded full

opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and crossexamine witnesses.

The Undersigned served as the Neutral Referee on the

Board of Arbitration.

Captains William F. McKinney and Darrell T. Webb

served as the Company Board members.

Captains John R. Dell Isola and

Donald H. Brown, Jr. served as the Union Board members.
The Oath of the Arbitrators was waived.

A stenographic record

of the hearing was taken; the parties filed post-hearing briefs; and the
Board of Arbitration conferred in executive session on June 26, 1992.

captain Pitts' letter of September 11, 1990, addressed to the
grievant, reads as follows:
Dear Captain Klemp:
The investigation referred to in my letter to you dated
August 10, 1990, has been completed.
The subject of that
investigation was your absence from duty during the period 12
July 1990 through 3 August 1990.
At a meeting on 23 August 1990, we discussed your being on
sick leave and absent from duty during the subject period.
You stated that you had the flu on July 10 and subsequently
lower back pain on July 26; and you went on to say that you had
not bothered to go to a doctor for treatment or a diagnosis of
your problems.
The Company does not want its pilots flying while they are
ill, but by the same token, TWA has every right to expect fulltime service from its employees. Your activities during the
subject period were well-publicized and did not lend themselves
to the support of your status as a full-time employee at TWA.
Your attempts to secure Personal Time Off for that period are
documented; and that having failed, you subsequently called off
schedule ill.
In summary, I find your behavior in this matter to be
unacceptable.
You have not provided the Company any
documentation of your illness; and, worse yet, you have
manipulated to deprive TWA of your full-time services.
Your
record indicates you have been formally counseled on two
previous occasions concerning your attendance with the most
recent resulting in the letter of reprimand by Captain Fallucco
on February 7, 1989.
In consideration of the above, it is my intention to remove
you from the active payroll (AWD) for a period of thirty (30)
days. This action will be in accordance with the time limits
specified in Section 21 of the Working Agreement.
As that letter indicates, and based on the Company's claim in
the arbitration, the Company charges the grievant with an abuse of sick
leave benefits by falsely claiming he was ill and by improperly taking

sick leave and receiving sick pay when he was actually campaigning for the
Republican nomination for Governor of the State of Kansas.

He faked his

illness, asserts the Company, after his request for time off for that
political purpose was denied by the Company and after his efforts, with
the Company's assistance, to swap vacation time with other pilots, failed.
This

case

is

replete

with

suspicious

circumstances

and

circumstantial evidence which point in
those suspicious circumstances and the
circumstantial evidence add up probatively to the clear and convincing/
I
evidentiary standard required in a disciplinary case.
First, is the coincidence of the grievant's failed efforts to be
excused from work for a period of time for the acknowledged political
objective

and his subsequent

claimed illness

(flu and back pain) for

virtually the same period of time.
Next is his admission that twice, while allegedly ill from flu
or with severe back pains, he attended two political rallies in the
furtherance of his candidacy.

One was reported in the press and the other

he acknowledged voluntarily.
Next is his admission that over the approximately 21-day period,
with first the flu and then back pains, he did not see a physician and
therefore could not supply medical substantiation of the claimed illness
and disability when asked by the Company to do so upon his return to work.
Next

is

his

statement

that

despite

not

seeking

medical

attention, he nonetheless took prescription pain killers which he said

disqualified him from flying in any event, and that that medication
consisted of seven pills left over from an earlier back episode when he
did see a doctor.
Next is the Company's claim that during the investigation by
Captain Pitts of the circumstances of the absence upon the grievant's
return to work, the grievant made an admission against interest by stating
that he had decided that "he could not serve the people of Kansas and
still fly."
determined

The Company interprets that to mean that the grievant was
to take

the time off to campaign, and as that was his

overriding priority, falsely claimed illness in order to achieve that
objective.
The issue is not simply whether the grievant's testimony is
directly believable, but rather whether, on the totality of the evidence,
the Company has met its burden of showing that he is not to be believed,
by contrary evidence that meets the clear and convincing standard.
Though I, too, may harbor the same suspicions as does the
Company, I cannot conclude that the requisite level of proof elevating
those suspicions to probative conclusiveness, has been met.
I conclude that it is not enough to prove the charge by the bare
fact that the grievant's claimed illness coincided with the period of time
he had previously requested off.

The record requires more evidence to

find as a matter of fact that the coincidence of illness with the time he
sought as personal leave, is unbelievable.
fair conclusion.

That it is improbable is a

That it is unbelievable cannot be so concluded in the

absence of further independent evidence to the contrary.
Also, evidence and his acknowledgement of participation in two
political rallies at a time that he claimed he was ill with the flu or

suffering from back pains is also not enough in my view to prove the
falseness of his sick leave claim.

Realistically, political zealousness

and ambition may be enough to permit limited campaigning in the form of
appearances at two political events even if suffering from the flu or back
pains.

And that is what he claims.

Standing alone, the claim of illness

and two appearances at political rallies are not so mutually exclusive as
to determinatively conclude that the latter establishes the falsity of the
former.
Nor is the grievant's failure to obtain medical treatment or see
a

physician

enough

to

prove

the charge

against

him.

The Company

acknowledges that employees are not required to see a physician or obtain
medical substantiation

of illness that keeps them out of work.

Here,

during his absence and claimed illness, he was not directed to see a
doctor, not told to obtain medical substantiation to be submitted during
his absence or when he returned to work.

Indeed, he and other pilots have

been off work with claimed illnesses in the past without being required to
see a physician or submit medical proof of the illness or disability.
Again, while unlikely that he would take prescription medication
without a physician's contemporary approval, it is certainly not out of
the question.

Retention of pills from a prior back episode is quite

possible and the use of them during a subsequent episode, without seeing
the doctor, though unwise, is not unusual or even uncommon.

Despite

lingering suspicions, I cannot conclude, based on the hard evidence, that
his testimony in that regard was false.
In

fact,

much

of what

the

grievant's explanations, cut both ways.

Company

relies

on,

namely the

Certainly he knew, after his

request for time off was rejected, that if he took the time anyway with a
false excuse of illness
scrutinized

and disability,

by the Company.

that

claim would

be

closely

And unless he could dispel the Company's

skepticism, he would be in danger of discipline.

That being so, it seems

to me, he would have taken steps to prepare and present a better defense,
albeit a false one, if in fact, his claim of illness and disability was
untrue.

Why, for example, one may logically ask, would he have put

himself in an obviously precarious position for what he must have known
and the record discloses, was at best a long shot political campaign. His
candidacy did not have organizational support.
a major contender, and ultimately
primary.

withdrew

In short, the circumstances are more

than conclusive.
single claim —

He was not recognized as
from the race before the
questionable and illusive

As each of the foregoing circumstances flow from the
namely that he was ill and disabled, their cumulative

effect is no more determinative than each separately.
I am troubled by the grievant's denial that he said to Captain
Pitts that he "couldn't serve the people of Kansas and still fly."

I seel

no reason why Captain Pitts would not have remembered that statement and;
no reason why Captain Pitts would fabricate it.
the statement

Bjut, more importantly,!

is not so lacking in ambiguity as to be the admission

against interest attributed to it by the Company.
interpretations.

It is subject to twq

The first is an admission that he had decided to take

off from flying to campaign and to do so under any circumstances.

The

conclusion from that is that his claim of illness and disability was
false.

The other

interpretation

application for time off.

is that it applied to his original

Meaning, that he asked for the time off because

he recognized he could not campaign for the Governorship and fly at the
same time.

The record before me is not clear enough to decide what the

statement referred to and to what point in the history of this event it
obtained.

As such

it retains

an inconclusive

ambiguity.

However,

whatever it meant, I must conclude that the grievant was not truthful in
denying making the remark.

For that, some penalty is justified, and shall

be assessed in the Award.
It

is understandable

if the

Company asks,

how, under the

foregoing circumstantial evidence and suspicious coincidences is it to
prove its case if the record is presently deemed inadequate?

Under the

suspicious circumstances of this case, the Company should have conducted
its

own

independent

investigation

right

from

the

beginning

certainly during the pendency of the grievant's absence.
the Company would have been justified
assess his condition.

of and

In my judgment,

in visiting him at his home to

It would have been justified, in my judgment, to

send a physician to examine him at the beginning of and during the
absence.

It would have been justified, in my opinion, if the Company

maintained a surveillance of the grievant and his activities during his
absence.

It would have been justified, in my opinion, if it had told him

from the moment that he reported that he was ill and disabled that he was
to obtain a medical statement substantiating that claim; to send it to the
Company forthwith or present it upon his return to work, particularly in
view of his prior record of absenteeism.

Considering the suspicious

coincidences and circumstances of this case, all of these steps, and
others of a similar type, would not only have been proper but would have
represented the kind of independent inquiry into the bonafides of the
grievant's claimed illness which could transform
convincing, negative, conclusion.

suspiciousness

to a

In sum, this is not to say that I find

that the grievant was ill and/or suffering from back pains.
frank to say that I have personal doubts.

Indeed, I am

But doubts, suspicions and

speculation

are not enough to meet the requisite

standard of proof.

Regardless of the Arbitrator's intuitive view, it is to the clear and
convincing

standard of proof to which he is bound in discharging his

arbitrable duties in disciplinary cases.

Eric J. Schmertz
Neutral Referee

-X

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Office and Professional Employees
International Union, Local 153
OPINION AND AWARD

and
United Federation of Teachers
Local 2, American Federation of
Teachers, AFL-CIO
-X

The stipulated issue is:
Did United Federation of Teachers, Local 2 violate
Article VI, Section 1 of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement when

it paid members of Local

153 the

equivalent of double time for Veteran's Day, November
10, 1989?
A

If so, what shall be the remedy?

hearing

was

held

on

January

24,

1992

at

which

time

representatives of Local 153, hereinafter referred to as the "Union," and
United Federation of Teachers, Local 2, hereinafter referred to as the
"Employer," appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity to

offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.
The Union's case has obvious equitable appeal.
Under identical circumstances, the Employer administered the
identical contract language in two separate contracts, differently.
pertinent contract language reads:
...all work performed on any of the above-enumerated
Holidays

or

work

performed

on

Sundays

shall

compensated for by twice the regular rate of pay.

be

The

...if a Holiday falls on a day when the office must
remain open, the employee may, at his/her discretion
opt for a compensatory day or receive an additional
day's pay.
Veteran's Day is one of the enumerated Holidays.
For

Veteran's

Day,

1989,

when

the

office

remained open,

employees under the Union contract who worked that day were paid double
time under the foregoing contract language.
For the same day, Veteran's Day, 1989, under identical language
in the Employer's contract with the Printers Union, the Employer paid
members of the Printers bargaining unit who worked, triple time.
However, despite the obvious disparate treatment between the
Union

members

and

employees

under

the

Printers'

contract,

the

determinative question is whether the Union's case can be sounded in
contract violation.
It must be noted that the stipulated issue deals only with an
alleged violation of the Union's contract. Moreover, it well-settled that
where the contract

language is dispositive of the issue in dispute,

equitable considerations do not come in to play.
stipulated

Also, under both the

issue and the arbitration provisions of the contract, the

Arbitrator's authority is limited to determining whether there has been a
contract violation.
provisions

of

the

Section 2 of the Grievance Machinery and Arbitration
Union's

contract

defines

a

grievance

as

a

"dispute...relating to any matter of wages, hours and working conditions,
or any dispute between the parties involving interpretation or application
of any provision of this agreement."

(Emphasis added)

The Union asserts that by paying the Printers triple time, the
Employer changed what the Employer and the Union previously understood to
be the meaning of the foregoing contract language, thereby entitling those
members of the Union who worked on Veteran's Day, triple time also.
The

problem

with

that

theory

is that

though

a different

application of one contract covering employees of a different bargaining
unit

may

be unsettling

to good

labor

relations

and

a prima facie

inequality, it cannot be deemed a variation or new interpretation of the
Union's contract unless the treatment of employees under that contract was
changed.

The Employer's treatment of employees in the Union's bargaining

unit remained

consistent and the same as they had been treated since that

full language was originally negotiated in their contract.
other instance

In the only

in which an enumerated Holiday fell on a day that the

office was open, Lincoln's birthday in 1983, the employees under the
Union's contract were paid only double time. And, the Union concedes that
at that time and until the instant difference between it and the Printers'
contract

arose,

it

agreed

with

the

application of the contract language.

Employer's

interpretation

and

It specifically accepted the last

sentence thereof;
"If a Holiday falls on a day when the office must
remain opened, the employee may at his/her discretion
opt for a compensatory day or receive an additional
day's pay,"
as intended to limit the total amount of pay to double time.

Indeed, the

Union states that had the Printers not been paid triple time, the instance
grievance would not have been filed.

That the Employer paid the Printers triple time under identical
circumstances was an action not under the Union's contract and therefore
not a variation thereof.

Rather, it was a separate, albeit different,

application of a different collective bargaining agreement, covering a
different bargaining unit, namely its contract with the Printers.
One

might

ask, why

not

apply the well-settled

rule that

employees similarly situated must be dealt with similarly, and that to
give

a

benefit

to

some

and

not

discriminatory and must be reversed.

to

others

similarly

situated

is

The rule is inapposite here. The

members of the Union's bargaining unit are not similarly situated to
others.

The "similarly situated" rule is confined to those within the

same bargaining unit.

Hence, as to employees covered by other contracts,

a larger grant of a benefit than that accorded Union members, as unfair as
that may appear, applies to a group of employees differently situated,
because they are covered by a different contract.

And, therefore, not

legally of the same class.
But frankly, I am not comfortable with the Employers explanation
of the distinctions.

It states that the Union knew, by negotiations and

prior notice, following an earlier arbitration, that Article VI, Section
1 limited pay under the facts of this case to double time.

But that

because the Printers' contract is its first agreement with the Employer,
and because the Printers did not have the same bargaining history or
notice of the purpose and intent of the same contract language as did the
Union, the Employer acknowledged to the Printers that the bare language
was ambiguous, subject to an interpretation supporting triple-time pay,
and therefore gave the affected Printers triple time.

I believe that the Printer's Union knew or should have known
that this particular contract language was identical with and adopted from
the Union's contract.

Therefore, I believe it knew or should have known

constructively at least, of the meaning and application the Employer and
Union put on it.
That being so, and because of the unsettling impact on good
labor relations, created by employees in two different bargaining units,
working side-by-side, but treated differently under the same facts and
contract language, I choose to make a recommendation.

I recommend that

without prejudice or precedent, the Employer grant an additional day's pay
to Union members who worked on Veteran's Day, 1989, thereby according them
parity with the Printers who worked that day.

This recommendation is for

the Employer to accept or reject in its discretion,

and therefore, the

Award is in no way changed or modified.
I believe that the recommendation also makes sense because it is
my understanding that the new contracts negotiated by the Employer with
both Unions have clarified this matter and that such a Holiday pay
discrepancy will not happen again.
consistency

in

the

interpretation

And that henceforth, there shall be
and

application

provisions of both collective bargaining agreements.

of

the Holiday

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named parties makes the
following AWARD:
Local 2 did not violate Article VI, Section 1 of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement when it paid members
of

Local

153

the

equivalent

of

double

time for

Veteran's Day, November 10, 1989.

Eric J. Schmertz
DATED:

February 7, 1992

STATE OF NEW YORK

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF NEW YORK )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument,
which is my AWARD.

